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Partnerships
Manjari Singh
India’s relations with the Gulf countries have been exceptionally significant 
since ancient times and are multifaceted. The two have maintained 
historical ties with each other in terms of trade, energy, security as 
well as a vast expatriate population. While the Indo-Gulf relations are 
dominated by energy cooperation, recent years have experienced a shift in 
their dynamics. Owing to Persian Gulf countries’ quest to achieve Vision 
2030 through economic diversification, Indo-Gulf relations have seen an 
expansion in other non-conventional areas such as security cooperation 
and strategic partnerships. India is not in military alliance with any of 
the major powers, however, it shares close strategic and military relations 
with many major countries in the world. Owing to growing stature of 
India and its clout a  the global table, India started to build strategic 
partnerships with major countries such as France, Russia, Germany, and 
the US, etc., since 1997.1 It is noteworthy that India has extended its 
strategic partnerships with as many as four countries in the Gulf, namely, 
Iran, Oman, Saudi Arabia, the UAE since 2003.2 This shows that over 
a period of time the region holds immense significance for India’s 
ascendance as a growing regional and global power. 
Dr. Manjari Singh is an Associate Fellow at Centre for Land Warfare Studies (CLAWS), New 
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India shares historical relations with the Persian Gulf which date 
back to ancient civilisations during the reign of Indus Valley in the 
subcontinent and Dilmun Empire in the region. This relationship was 
predominantly trade-oriented which continued to be the case until very 
late. Pre-independent India under British control showed its imperial 
interest in the Gulf and trade was monitored, pursued and administered 
from Bombay Presidency.3 Until the 1960s, the Indian rupee was a legal 
tender in most of the countries in the Gulf, namely, Kuwait, Bahrain, 
Qatar, Oman and the UAE.4 India traded in rupees which was a special 
note exclusively printed to be used in the Gulf, hence popularly known 
as “Gulf Rupee” since the time oil was discovered in Persia (then Iran), 
by the British on May 26, 1908.5 The trade basket during these times 
expanded from raw materials, silk, spices, etc., to majorly energy import. 
However, relations were still transactional in nature. 
Geographically, the Persian Gulf was an immediate neighbour of India 
and was directly connected to Iran prior to its independence in 1947 
and partition. However, the importance of the region still remains the 
same as it is an integral part of India’s extended neighbourhood in terms 
of geographical proximity, expansion of interests and growing Indian 
clout in the entire region.6 Today, Indo-Gulf relationships have expanded 
at many levels and the Persian Gulf is key to India’s growth story. The 
importance of the region is reflected in India’s continued interests and 
engagements. For instance, towards the beginning of the twenty-first 
century, India’s exports to the Gulf were more than its exports to the 
European Union.7 Strategic relations with the Persian Gulf are in many 
ways responsible for India’s economic development, social progress and 
political ascendance.8 This importance and recognition is reflected in the 
increased engagements that India has had with many countries in the 
region especially over the past decade. 
The article delves into the change of perception of the Gulf for New 
Delhi, changing dynamics, growing terrorism, etc., that has compelled the 
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latter to expand its relations from transactional to strategic partnerships. 
Moreover, the present pandemic that has engulfed the entire world calls 
for more engaged strategic partnerships with the Gulf as terror outfits are 
likely to take a cue from the current situation and develop Corona-like 
viruses or biological weapons to target select nationalities. As terrorism is 
a concern for both India and the countries in the Gulf, coming times will 
probably see more engagements of the two in this regard. 
India-Gulf: Traditional and Transactional Relations
Traditionally, India’s relations with the Gulf countries have been dictated 
by energy imports since the discovery of oil in the region and the cheaper 
rates available. With a growing population and India’s quest to become 
a fast growing economy,9 energy security is essential for its growth. 
Therefore, for very long, Indo-Gulf relations were purely of a buyer and 
a seller. The foundation of the relationship is based on the 3Es, namely, 
energy, economy and expatriates.10 Even though Indo-Gulf relations still 
rest on the 3Es, nevertheless, the 3Es have acted as a complementary 
factor in upping the strategic partnerships.
Currently, the countries of the UAE, Saudi Arabia and Iraq are among 
the top five import sources (as of 2019, Iraq has dropped to the sixth 
position) for India after China and the US.11 The UAE is also the second-
biggest export destination for the country. The bulk of imports from the 
region are dominated by oil and gas to fulfil India’s energy requirements. 
Imports from the Gulf are crucial t  the country’s development. As of 
2019, India’s energy import dependence stood at 84 per cent,12 out of 
which 55 per cent comes from the Persian Gulf alone.13 If this is not 
enough, even total trade component with the region is higher than many 
of India’s immediate neighbours. In purely economic terms, India’s total 
trade with the region for the year 2019-20 (till February 2020) stood at 
over US$ 139 billion or more than 19 per cent of India’s total foreign 
trade. Some of the Persian Gulf countries are top 25 trading Partners, 
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namely, the UAE (3rd), Saudi Arabia (4th), Iraq (6th), Qatar (22nd) and 
Kuwait (25th).14 Owing to recurrent US imposed sanctions and removal 
of waivers, Iran’s place as the third trading partner has come down to 
38th position and Oman stands at 35th. 
Needless to mention, the trade statistics has not changed over the years. 
India’s Director-General of Foreign Trade, the trade data collecting agency 
of the Ministry of Commerce and Industry, provides region-wise import-
export data from 1996-97 onwards. Table 1 in that regard suggests that 
India’s total trade, both imports and exports, have significantly increased 
over the period of time. While Persian Gulf’s share in total imports increased 
marginally from 11.15 per cent in 1996-97 to 15.51 per cent in 2018-19, 
its export share almost doubled from 7.22 per cent to 12.61 per cent during 
the same time. In terms of imports 2010-14 was the most significant time 
period owing to lowering of oil prices. The table also reveals that for the 
past 3 to 4 years, while the imports had started to increase despite Iranian 
sanctions and removal of waivers for India, exports have seen a decline. 
Table 1: Persian Gulf Share in India’s Total Imports and Exports










1996-97 39,132.41 11.15 33,469.95 7.22
1997-98 41,484.49 10.49 34,784.98 7.79
1998-99 42,388.71 13.25 33,218.72 9.09
1999-2000 49,738.06 12.39 36,822.49 8.71
2000-1 50,536.45 3.32 44,560.29 8.76
2001-2 51,413.28 3.28 43,826.72 8.66
2002-3 61,412.14 3.07 52,719.43 9.31
2003-4 78,149.11 4.16 63,842.55 11.06
2004-5 111,517.43 6.33 83,535.94 11.74
2005-6 149,165.73 5.23 103,090.53 11.42
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2006-7 185,735.24 16.68 126,414.05 11.95
2007-8 251,654.01 17.91 163,132.18 13.33
2008-9 303,696.31 19.59 185,295.36 17.33
2009-10 288,372.88 18.55 178,751.43 17.05
2010-11 369,769.13 20.26 251,136.19 17.00
2011-12 489,319.49 20.88 305,963.92 14.82
2012-13 490,736.65 22.02 300,400.68 16.99
2013-14 450,199.78 22.61 314,405.29 15.33
2014-15 448,033.40 18.84 310,338.48 15.88
2015-16 381,006.62 14.64 262,290.13 15.89
2016-17 384,355.56 14.35 275,851.71 15.14
2017-18 465,580.99 13.76 303,526.16 12.97
2018-19 514,078.20 15.51 330,078.09 12.61
Source: Adapted from Director-General of Foreign Trade, New Delhi, www.dgft.gov.in
In the quest of diversifying the relations, India and the countries in 
the region have invested in infrastructure development in both India as 
well as in the Gulf. For instance, in June 2018, Saudi Aramco and Abu 
Dhabi National Oil Company (ADNOC) signed an agreement with India 
to jointly develop the largest refinery in the world in Ratnagiri Refinery 
and Petrochemicals Limited (RRPCL) in Ratnagiri, Maharashtra. The 
refinery will produce about 1.2 million barrels per day of oil and all the 
three partners will supply at least 50 per cent of the crude that the refinery 
will process.15 Similarly, Indian companies such as HCL, L&T and TCS 
have emerged as strong potential investors in energy, transportation, food 
processing, and information technology sectors in the region.
If total trade with the Gulf remains significant for India, energy 
remains the main commodity for transaction. As stated earlier, 
presently around 55 per cent of India’s energy imports are from the 
Gulf countries. The countries in the region are not only cheap suppliers 
of hydrocarbons but due to geographical proximity there is a further 
cost-cutting involved. Table 2 suggests that the importance of Persian 
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Gulf energy imports are highly significant and are majorly energy 
based. This has continued to be the case for many years. However, 
as reflected in the table, there is a slight decrease in energy imports, 
this is because owing to the political instability in the Persian Gulf and 
fluctuations in oil prices India has been trying to diversify its energy 
import partners and buys oil from the US, Nigeria and Russia as well 
recently. This is to “cut costs and help shield itself from geopolitical 
tensions.”16 For instance, owing to Iranian sanctions, in 2019 alone, 
India imported 4.49 million tonnes (MT) of crude oil from the US 
while Nigeria took Iran’s position as the third largest supplier of crude 
with 7.17 MT of crude for the same year.17 India increased its share 
of oil imports from Russia and bought 2.13 MT of crude from it. 
Moreover, the countries in the region are also trying to diversify their 
economy and thus investments in other sectors such as construction, 
banking, infrastructure development, etc., have increased. 
Table 2: India’s Energy Imports from the Persian Gulf Region  
(in US$ million)
Year Total Persian Gulf Total 
Imports
Per cent Persian Gulf 
Imports to Total Imports
2007-8 54,365.01 86,384.04 62.93
2008-9 62,282.89 103,933.77 59.93
2009-10 55,904.14 96,321.16 58.04
2010-11 66,688.4 115,929.06 57.53
2011-12 105,056.26 172,753.97 60.81
2012-13 105,859.19 181,344.67 58.37
2013-14 106,400.75 181,382.56 58.66
2014-15 85,300.3 156,399.98 54.54
2015-16 50,992.26 96,953.02 52.59
2016-17 56,335.34 103,163.2 54.6
Source: Adapted from Director-General of Foreign Trade, New Delhi, www.dgft.gov.in
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Notably, decrease in energy imports from Gulf is not indicative of 
India decreasing its engagements with the Gulf which has only increased 
over the years. This is because of expansion of relations from that based 
on transactions to partnerships. 
Of the 3Es, expatriates play a crucial role in making the relations 
strong and robust. It is estimated that 8.5-10 million Indian expatriates 
dwell in the Gulf (Table 3). The 8.5 million to 9 million figure is estimated 
by the Ministry of External Affairs and Ministry of Overseas Indian 
Affairs, however, Sebastian Irudaya Rajan estimates that there are about 
10 million expatriates in the Gulf, many of whom are undocumented. 
Table 3: Indian Expatriates in Persian Gulf, 2018
Country Non-Resident 
Indians (NRIs)
Persons of Indian 
Origin (PIOs)
Overseas Indians
Bahrain 312,918 3,257 316,175
Kuwait 928,421 1,482 929,903
Oman 688,226 919 689,145
Qatar 691,539 500 692,039
Saudi Arabia 2,812,408 2,160 2,814,568
UAE 3,100,000 4,586 3,104,586
Total 8,533,512 12,904 8,546,416
Source: Adapted from Ministry of External Affairs, https://mea.gov.in/images/attach/NRIs-
and-PIOs_1.pdf
According to the World Bank, India is the top recipient of remittances 
in the world which amounts to US$ 83.1 billion and accounts for 2.8 per 
cent of Indian GDP.18 This is attributed to India’s position as the largest 
country of origin of international migrants. Since the “oil boom” of the 
1970s, migration to the Gulf from southern states of India, especially 
Kerala, started and that gave impetus to the overall development of the 
country as remittances began to flow. In return, Indian migrant workers 
have also made substantial contribution to the development of Gulf States. 
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Notably, India-Gulf corridor is the second largest migration corridor in 
the world, after US-Mexico corridor. Of around 31 million non-resident 
Indians (NRIs), 8.5-10 million work in the Gulf and Indians constitute 
over 30 per cent of the expatriate workforce in the region.19 
Southern states of India and especially Kerala have been the major 
source of origin for Gulf migration. However, over the past decades there 
has been a decline in Kerala migration to the Gulf and it is pointed out 
that return migration for Kerala is on the rise and that the “long history 
of migration from Kerala to the Gulf is in its l st phase.”20 As of now, it 
is the northern states that have filled the space, namely, Uttar Pradesh, 
Bihar, Rajasthan and in southern states it is Tamil Nadu (Figure 1). It is 
noteworthy that the first three states are ranked as low-income states in 
the country and have declining job prospects in the formal and informal 
sectors alike and this has resulted in mass outflow of population to the 
Gulf. 
Figure 1: State-wise Distribution of Gulf Migrants, 2018
Source: Prepared by the Author in consultation with the Ministry of External Affairs, Annual 
Report 2018-19.21
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Nonetheless, due to economic slowdowns, fluctuating oil prices, 
and changes in Gulf labour policies in the region because of focus on 
indigenisation, there has been a slackening in the outflow of Indian 
migrants. Paradoxically, there has been an increase in remittances 
by 14-18 per cent by 2019. The advent of coronavirus pandemic has 
created an unprecedented health and livelihood challenge for the Indian 
migrants working in the Gulf and their dependants and this has led to 
many returning to India. However, a cross-sectional examination of the 
profile of the Indians that returned by May clearly indicates that only 
the dependants, dependants with health issues and the undocumented 
migrants are the ones that have returned.22 This phenomenon that will 
require absorption of returnees in the already shrinking job market in 
the country will be a daunting challenge for the Indian government.23 
Moreover, it is also pointed by Irudaya Rajan that because of lack of 
Public Relations (PR) policy in the Gulf for Indians in contrast to the 
ones in western countries, Gulf migrants by virtue of absence of PR policy 
have always been return migrants. 
This is partly also because of the fact that the majority of Indian 
migrants in the Gulf are employed in blue-collar jobs in the “3Ds sector,” 
namely, “dirty, dangerous and demeaning,” and thus did not receive the 
due attention of policymakers for long. According to Rajan, “there is 
no such thing as an Indo-Gulf Person”24 and therefore India should be 
prepared to absorb such migrants as and when necessary or should focus 
on creating a PR policy for the Gulf too. It was only recently, in the past 
few decades, that Gulf migrants’ contribution to the development of Gulf 
countries—as well as India, because of the remittances that it receives—
has been well acknowledged. Therefore, a robust planning in this regard 
will be necessary to deal with the forthcoming population pressure on 
the country. 
Following the trend, it is clear that Indo-Gulf relations in terms of 
economy, energy and expatriates have been affected over a period of time. 
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Even though the number of expatriates in the region has been increasing 
by number, the proportion of unskilled or semi-skilled workers from the 
northern states of India which are majorly low-income states, is on the 
rise (Figure 1). During corona crisis and after that there is a possibility 
that India will receive more numbers of Gulf returnees. If this is not 
enough, owing to diversification of economies in the Gulf, drive to 
achieve respective Visions, Gulf being conflict prone as a challenge to 
India’s vast energy demands, fluctuating energy prices and India’s own 
diversification of energy source and types, etc., have been the reasons for 
the decline in Indo-Gulf’s economy and energy transactions. 
Therefore, despite the challenges in all the three pillars, Indo-Gulf 
relations are thriving at a good pace. This is well reflected in India 
enhancing its relations at strategic levels with over half of the countries 
in the region, namely, Iran, Oman, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE; with 
Qatar, India has signed military training and cooperation agreement.25 
This suggests that despite all the traditional challenges to the relationship, 
the Gulf still remains an important region in India’s foreign policy. This 
is reflected in the number of high-level visits that have taken place to and 
from the region, most of which took place since the time Prime Minister 
Narendra Modi was elected in May 2014.26
Indo-Gulf: Ascendance to Strategic Partnership
Since 2003, India’s relations with major Persian Gulf countries have 
been elevated to strategic partnerships. Iran not only became the first 
country in the region with which India established strategic relations in 
2003 but also the relations were established prior to Indo-US relations 
at that level. This shift in attitude towards the region is attributed to 
the diversification of dimensions between the two. India currently has 
strategic partnerships with four countries in the Gulf and with Qatar it 
has a security and military cooperation. It is necessary to understand, 
despite the instability predicted for the region time and again, what the 
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reason is behind New Delhi’s decision to elevate relations at that level. 
This is because, as of now, India has such agreements with some of the 
major countries in the world. Giving that space to the Gulf suggests that 
unlike the popular notion that India is shifting its focus from the Gulf (in 
terms of diversification of energy sources, challenges for Indian migrants 
due to indigenisation policies in many of the Persian Gulf countries and 
focus on the Indo-Pacific) to other parts of the world is unwarranted. 
A strategic partnership entails “a long-term interaction between two 
countries based on political, economic, soci l and historical factors. 
Such partnership manifests itself in a variety of relationships.”27 
India has strategic partnerships with around 30 co ntries in the 
world of which four are in the Persian Gulf. The US, China, Russia, 
the UK, Israel, Japan, France, and Germany are some of the major 
countries with which India has strategic partnerships. However, all 
the strategic partnerships are not the same and not equally important. 
Different dimensions play a major role in relationships with different 
countries. Some have a dominant political element while others may 
have a prominent economic dimension and security cooperation may 
be important for a few. Therefore, there is a hierarchy in strategic 
partnerships. India’s strategic partnership with the Gulf countries 
involves the vital role played by all the dimensions. Owing to the largest 
number of Indian expatriates and huge remittance flow, the human 
security angle becomes important. The Gulf, being predominantly 
Muslim, becomes a political angle in Indo-Gulf relations to keep 
Pakistan at bay. Energy security and foreign investments are other 
areas of cooperation. Therefore, Indo-Persian Gulf is a special case 
and the two share a robust and dynamic strategic partnership. 
Increasing incidences of terrorism, sprawling terror outfits and 
probability of re-emergence of Islamic State (IS) is a matter of 
concern to both India and countries in the region. Even though 
predominantly Arab, the Gulf is weary of Iran’s activating terror 
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outfits to conduct proxy wars against them. India maintains a non-
interventionist, non-prescriptive approach towards the region but 
is extremely aware and sensitive to Pakistan’s terror adventurism 
particularly in the Kashmir valley. Owing to these challenges posed by 
terrorism, Indo-Gulf strategic partnership rests on counterterrorism, 
money laundering, cybersecurity, organised crime, human trafficking and 
anti-piracy, traditional dimensions notwithstanding.28 
The enhancement of relations has reached a fair degree of success 
and “encompass defence and naval cooperation, including joint exercises, 
regular Indian ship visits and broad-based MoUs.” Indian defence 
and military academies train Gulf armed-forces personnel and all Gulf 
countries are members of the Indian Navy-conceived Indian Ocean Naval 
Symposium (IONS) established in 2008. Additionally, India has played 
an active role in enhancing the stability and security of the Gulf’s sea 
lanes through its joint participation in anti-piracy patrols off the coast of 
Somalia since 2008.29 
Moreover, upgradation of Indo-Saudi relations to strategic 
partnership took place in February 2010 during the signing of Riyadh 
Declaration which includes defence cooperation as a major component. 
Some scholars like Rahul Roy-Chaudhury opine that despite official Indian 
concerns over “Saudi funding to fundamentalist Muslim institutions in 
India, the two countries are developing a coordinated approach towards 
counter-extremism.”30 Additionally, a Saudi-Indian extradition treaty and 
agreement for transfer of sentenced persons have also been signed by 
the two. Under this arrangement, an Indian national Zabiuddin Ansari 
aka Abu Jundal, alleged handler of terrorists in 2008 Mumbai attack, 
was deported from Saudi Arabia and arrested in New Delhi on June 21, 
2012.31 
Counterterrorism plays a vital role as one of the primary drivers of 
increased security cooperation between the two regions is terrorism and 
radicalisation. Historically, both India and the Gulf countries have been 
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victims of terrorism which continues to manifest itself in various forms. 
Previously on a few occasions India has been critical of Gulf funding “the 
madrassas and terrorists groups in Pakistan” and has been wary of home-
grown militants seeking refuge in the Gulf.32 Moreover, as per Indian 
Intelligence agencies, Indians who joined IS had links with individuals in 
the Gulf.33 Given the highest number of Indian expatriates in the region, 
India is apprehensive of its citizens at higher risks of radicalisation or 
being victims of terror outfits. 
Similarly, in recent years, the Gulf countries have also changed their 
stance having faced tremendous international pressure and terror attacks 
in their own respective countries. It is because of these concerns that 
during the February 2019 visit of Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman 
aka MBS to India post-Pulwama attack, the Crown Prince remarked that 
the common concern for both the countries is to curtail terrorism and 
extremism. He extended his cooperation in the matter and applauded 
India’s role in combating the issue head-on.34 Given the concerns, the 
two countries agreed to constitute a comprehensive security dialogue 
at the level of National Security Advisors and to set up a joint working 
group on counterterrorism.35 
Even though strategic partnerships are not clearly defined certain 
ongoing collaborations suggest that both India and the Gulf will benefit 
tremendously in the long run. For instance, evacuation of Indian nationals 
during the time of crisis is also smoothened owing to the upgradation 
of relations to strategic levels. Evacuation of Indian expatriates during 
Yemen crisis was facilitated by efforts that involved countries in the region 
that otherwise do not see eye-to-eye. Therefore, this is the apt time when 
India should frame its otherwise absent evacuation policy under the 
upgraded strategic partnership. Notably, India has conducted the largest 
number of evacuation operations in the Gulf during conflict situations 
but yet does not have a robust policy for the same. In fact, during the 
corona crisis also, India had to send maximum number of flights to the 
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Gulf to fetch its citizenry. Given the equation with the countries an early 
warning system can be installed so that the country is not caught off 
guard and is fully prepared to fetch its expatriates. 
To conclude, Indo-Gulf relations have transformed from traditionally 
transaction-based to strategic partnerships. This shift is despite decreasing 
trends in commercial and trade relations, energy diversification in terms 
of source and type, and number of expatriates. Owing to the pandemic, 
these figures will further drop. However, the elevation of relations to 
strategic levels will not be affected and relations will continue to flourish 
because of common concerns to counterterrorism and extremism. This 
suggests that the Gulf’s role in Indian development is crucial and New 
Delhi should work in tandem with the Gulf nations to achieve its objective 
of becoming a regional and global power. Additionally, India should 
use the current circumstances of pandemic to its advantage and invest 
in framing a robust evacuation and PR policy to facilitate evacuation of 
its expatriates in the region. Moreover, India also needs to enhance its 
relations because of growing Chinese and Pakistani clout and this is when 
its 10 million strong expatriates will act as a leverage point to increase its 
own clout in the Gulf. 
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